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Abstract
Political scientists have developed three main interpretations of  the Icelandic 
power structure – namely, traditional elitism, competitive elitism and 
professional pluralism. These can be seen to some extent as successive regimes, 
with traditional elitism prevalent in the nineteenth century, competitive elitism 
for much of  the twentieth century and professional pluralism in more recent 
decades. However, their relative strength at different times, and the extent to 
which they still predominate, remains uncertain. This article evaluates how 
the different models reflect on the position of  the political elite over time and 
how helpful they are in understanding contemporary power structures. Data 
on the composition of  the political elite on one hand, and eight contemporary 
elite groups on the other are analysed in order to evaluate elite openness, elite 
selection and network patterns. The results provide support for conventional 
interpretations, in that competitive elitism replaced traditional elitism in 
important respects during the twentieth century, but has itself  been replaced in 
many respects by professional pluralism. Accordingly, professional pluralism is 
characteristic of  the contemporary power structure, with relatively open access 
to elite groups, strong influence of  meritocratic and professional criteria and 
network patterns which are concentrated within, rather than across, spheres of  
influence. Remnants of  traditional elite privilege and competitive elitism, where 
political parties play a central role, can be found in a number of  areas, and 
professional pluralism has important elitist features. 
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During the mid-1990s, Keith Dowding (1996 ix) noted that the great power debate 
on elitism and pluralism had run out of  steam, as he put it ‘with both sides apparently 
thinking they had won’. With regard to theoretical innovations, this is probably an apt 
description, although a number of  authors have continued producing high quality and 
innovative work in this area (e.g. Best & Higley 2010). Empirical studies on individual 
elites and elite structures remain relatively common, indicating the continuing relevance 
of  elite research, despite the controversy concerning their overall political influence. 
The Nordic countries, with the exception of  Iceland, have held on to the ambition of  
conducting comprehensive research on elites and elite structures at the societal level in 
a series of  power studies (see in particular Christiansen et al. 2001; Peterson et al. 1990; 
Ruostetsaari 2015; Østerud et al. 2004). While a certain amount of  variation may be 
observed among countries, the overall picture is one of  relative openness and (except in 
Finland) declining cohesiveness (e.g. Christiansen et al. 2001; Ruostetsaari 2007).
Corresponding research on Iceland is lacking. Although the idea of  an Icelandic 
power study has been entertained now and then since the 1980s, it has failed to win 
government support. This means that Iceland lags very much behind the other countries 
with regard to research on the power structure, including Icelandic elites. Important 
questions concerning elite openness, elite recruitment and cohesiveness remain uncov-
ered by empirical research. Therefore, it is the purpose of  the present paper to step into 
that void with data obtained in a power and democracy project funded by the University 
of  Iceland in 2015. The paper begins with an overview of  previous theorizing about 
political elites in Iceland, which serves as the point of  departure for the study of  the his-
torical development of  the political elite and the contemporary patterns of  elite open-
ness, recruitment and connectedness. On the basis of  the major models that emerge 
from this discussion, expectations are developed with regard to the main characteristics 
of  the Icelandic elite structure. This is followed by a short section on the data and then 
the presentation of  the main results concerning elite openness, selection principles and 
network patterns. 
1. Previous research
Despite the absence of  a major power study project, the Icelandic power structure has 
been a central subject in Icelandic political science since its inception at the University 
of  Iceland in the early 1970s. The first international journal publication by an Icelandic 
political scientist was Grímsson’s (1976) ‘The Icelandic Power Structure 1800–2000’, 
where he broad-brushed the main features of  the power structure in the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries. Numerous subsequent studies have been devoted to aspects of  the 
power structure. A review of  this literature can only be attempted in the most tentative 
terms in the present context, but the main features are rather striking. Three models of  
elite power in Iceland stand out, each with roots in different schools of  theorizing about 
power and power elites – namely, traditional elitism, competitive elitism and professional 
pluralism. Each model is anchored in international theorizing on the subject, including 
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elitism (Higley & Pakulski 2012), democratic elitism (Best & Higley 2010) and neo-
pluralism (Dunleavy & O’Leary 1987). Traditional elitism, characterized by closed and 
interconnected elites based on social position, was predominant during the nineteenth 
century and the first decades of  the twentieth century. This was followed by a variant 
of  the democratic elitist model, which may be termed competitive elitism, during the mid-
twentieth century, where party elites and their competition for power put their marks on 
many different spheres of  society, with a tendency to politicize administration, culture 
and the economy. During the last decades of  the twentieth century and into the twenty-
first century, the established power structure has been increasingly challenged by greater 
pluralist or neo-pluralist features, which we term professional pluralism, characterized by 
greater separation of  elites according to the sphere of  activity, and professionalization 
at the expense of  politicization.
The economic crash in 2008 once again placed elite versus popular power at the 
forefront of  public debate. The crash fuelled political distrust and spread perceptions of  
corruption (Vilhelmsdóttir et al. 2015; Erlingsson et al. 2016). Radical proposals for con-
stitutional change were partly directed against the established power structure, including 
party elites. Elites are increasingly the subject of  political rhetoric and the suspects in 
critical commentary. Thus, the question of  what kind of  elite structure prevails and how 
it affects the quality of  government remains highly relevant.
Power studies in political science face important conceptual and methodological 
challenges. Power, according to Lukes (1974), is an ‘essentially contested concept’ with-
out broad consensus on its definition or method. Beyond overt conflict (the one-dimen-
sional view), power may be applied through agenda control (the two-dimensional view) 
and through influence over subjective perceptions of  interests (three-dimensional view). 
In all cases, however, power seems to imply ‘the production of  intended effects’ (Russel 
1938; see also Wrong 1995). What is ‘intended’, however, may not always be obvious 
and, in some cases, the effects may be produced as much by luck as by effort (Dowding 
1996). The operationalization of  the concept in empirical research, therefore, remains 
problematic.
Control over resources is an essential prerequisite for power. To bring about desired 
results, individuals and organizations need financial means, knowledge, organization, 
contacts and other resources. However, control over resources may not be sufficient 
to bring about the desired effects, and various other factors (including luck) may affect 
outcomes. The study of  how resources are distributed is therefore relevant, but is not, 
strictly speaking, the same as studying power, at least not all of  its aspects. As resources 
are, to a significant extent, unevenly divided – as they are in all advanced societies – we 
can study aspects of  this distribution as a power structure. This does not imply that 
studying the distribution of  resources is the only way to study power. A decision-making 
approach is an equally feasible and possibly complementary way of  studying power or 








2. Three power structure models
Elite studies in Iceland have produced three main models, partly reflecting different the-
oretical traditions and also the different time-frames of  the research. Traditional elitism 
is concerned with the division between elite and non-elite and influenced by the works 
of  the classical elitists (including Mosca 1939; Pareto 1961; Michels 1962). It regards 
the elite as highly exclusive and autonomous. Competitive elitism is concerned with the 
competition for power among elite groups, in particular through party competition. In-
fluential authors in this tradition include Weber (1968) and Schumpeter (1976) (see also 
Held 1996). Elites, according to this view, compete for power across different spheres, 
with political parties playing a leading role. In contrast, professional pluralism is less 
concerned with the competition between elites than their control over separate spheres 
of  activity. It is influenced by the pluralist school of  thought, according to which plural 
elites co-exist in largely separate spheres of  society (Dahl 1961; Putnam 1977). The weak-
ening of  centralized political control is a concern of  some authors writing in this vein 
(Peters & Pierre 2004; Dahlström et al. 2011), while others take a more benign view of  
the effects of  limiting majoritarian institutions (Vibert 2007; Cornell & Lapuente 2014). 
Professional pluralism is the version of  pluralism most relevant to the Icelandic case, 
according to recent theorizing on the subject. Professional pluralism is an elite structure 
organized mainly according to professional criteria, with a relatively strong emphasis on 
professional meritocracy and cohesive professions, but weak inter-elite connections.
Traditional elitism. Traditional elitism has been most strongly advocated in Icelandic 
political science by Grímsson (1976), especially in his treatment of  the nineteenth cen-
tury and parts of  the twentieth century. According to him, Icelandic society during the 
nineteenth century was characterized by a highly elitist system, where the two major 
centres of  power, the administration and the Church, were ruled by a cohesive elite 
tied together through bonds of  kinship and privilege. Although the system developed 
some pluralist traits during the second half  of  the century through the emergence of  
the Alþingi (Icelandic parliament) in 1845 and the development of  a domestic press, 
the elite remained a closely knit group based on bonds of  kinship and school ties. The 
extension of  the franchise and the growing political impact of  class-based divisions in 
the early twentieth century increased the pluralist traits of  the system as the established 
elites of  the politics of  independence (i.e. pre-1918) faced challenges from the emerg-
ing class-based groups. Grímsson argued, however, that as class politics became the 
predominant feature of  the system, from around 1930 to 1950–60, its pluralist features 
were weakened as a small group of  party leaders took control of  different spheres of  
society and strongly influenced the administration, judiciary, interest groups, media, cul-
ture and economy. 
The dynamic factors contributing to elite power in Iceland, according to Grímsson’s 
analysis, seem to be, above all, kinship ties and educational privileges. The decreasing 
importance of  such ties during the second half  of  the twentieth century contributed 
to growing pluralism and, at the time of  writing – in 1976 – Grímsson predicted that 
pluralist traits would be predominant by the turn of  the century.
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Although Grímsson presented no systematic evidence to support his case, there 
seems to be little reason to doubt that the power structure in nineteenth-century Iceland 
was elitist in many respects. In comparison to other systems, however, it may have been 
relatively egalitarian. An Icelandic aristocracy, for instance, never existed. Nordal (1994, 
100) suggests that there was little difference between the social position of  well-to-do 
farmers and the literati (lærðir menn) during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and, 
together, the two formed a relatively closed upper class. Grimsson’s account of  the 
twentieth century is more problematic. Many accounts of  Icelandic politics during the 
twentieth century portray it as relatively conflict-ridden compared to the rest of  the 
Nordic region (Jónsson 2014). To group conservatives and communists into a single 
ruling political elite seems odd. Similarly, the extent to which elite privilege has actually 
disappeared as a feature of  a new pluralist system calls for closer attention. Torfason 
et al. (2017) indicate that their study on present-day business elites in Iceland reveal ‘a 
layered elite structure and gaps in elite–populace relations’ (2).
Competitive elitism. Interpretations of  the Icelandic power structure as competitive elit-
ism take as their point of  departure the competition between party elites for positions 
of  power and the important rewards that such positions may yield. As in Grímsson’s 
account of  mid-twentieth century Icelandic politics, the party elites play a central role, 
according to this, but they constitute separate and partly hostile elites, rather than a 
single cohesive group. The Icelandic political parties evolved in the inter-war period 
as organizations with a great deal of  external influence, but relatively elitist internal 
structures (Kristinsson 1993; Kristjánsson 1993). The old party groups of  the period 
of  traditional elitism were replaced during this period by class parties, which combined 
mass-party organization with a strong element of  patronage (Indriðason 2005; Kristins-
son 1996; Kristjánsson 1993). Their access to highly valued public positions and services 
was facilitated by a relatively weak bureaucracy at the national and local levels and the 
inability of  the administration to form a coalition to safeguard bureaucratic autonomy, 
which was essential for preventing the development of  patronage politics in many other 
places (Shefter 1994). 
While the main parties to a great extent shared the dividends of  political patronage, 
privileged access to state power was in most cases a crucial element in the patronage 
networks of  parties and politicians. This encouraged political conflict and competition 
for power. Minority governments were not tolerated, and a strong emphasis on mini-
mum winning coalitions went hand in hand with ministerial government, where each 
member of  a governing coalition was relatively autonomous in disposing of  patronage 
goods which belonged to their portfolios (Kristinsson & Indriðason 2007). The political 
parties were connected to many different spheres of  society and controlled the exchange 
of  political support and patronage rewards which fed the system.
Professional pluralism. In the 1960s, there were signs of  increasing dissatisfaction with 
the system of  ‘party rule’ (flokksræði) (Kristjánsson 1994). Several developments chal-
lenged competitive elitism in the following decades. Kristinsson (2012) suggests that 







economy made the business sector less dependent on political access than before, re-
ducing (but by no means eliminating) the clout of  political elites in the economy. Pro-
fessionalization was a second factor contributing to the reduction of  party control, as 
professional criteria for decision-making in both the public and private sectors – includ-
ing appointments – increasingly replaced political ones. Furthermore, the media market 
underwent considerable changes in the last decades of  the twentieth century, as state- 
and party-controlled media increasingly gave way to commercial media. While influential 
groups still compete for influence over the media, the political parties have lost much of  
their former control. Finally, the professionalization of  politics and campaigning made 
the parties less dependent on their old clientelist networks than before. The job of  a 
parliamentarian was recognized as a full-time occupation during the 1960s, and during 
the 1970s, it became rare for members of  parliament (MPs) to occupy other positions 
parallel to working in the Alþingi (Kristjánsson 1994). Running the parties became in-
creasingly costly as professional techniques replaced voluntary work, although the in-
troduction of  party primaries around 1970 kept the need for personal contact networks 
alive (see also Kopecký & Mair 2012). 
While there seems to be little doubt that professionalism and pluralism became in-
creasingly strong characteristics of  the Icelandic power structure compared to earlier 
periods, it remains to be established how far remnants of  the older power structures 
still co-exist with the new one. After all, powerful groups rarely surrender their privi-
leges voluntarily. Thus, important groups from the era of  traditional elitism established 
a strong foothold in the system of  competitive elitism through the formation of  the 
Independence Party (IP – Conservative) in 1929 (Guðmundsson 1979). Similarly, party 
control remains strongly represented at the centres of  political power in the Alþingi and 
cabinet.
In seeking to map contemporary elite structures in Iceland, we make use of  a simpli-
fied presentation of  elite characteristics presented in Table 1. 
Table 1. Elite characteristics according to the three elite models
Traditional elitism Competitive elitism Professional pluralism
Openness Socially exclusive Politically exclusive Professionally exclusive
Selection principles High status Political selection Professional meritocracy
Network patterns Social networks Political networks Professional networks
Traditional elitism is socially exclusive, and elites are primarily recruited on the basis 
of  high social status. Such elites are likely to be male and highly dependent on parental 
status. Although individual rivalries may be prominent, the elite as a whole belongs to 
the top layers of  society. The political elites of  competitive elitism are less socially exclu-
sive. A plebeian element is introduced through the competition for popular support and 
connections to the world of  organized interests. Political connections are crucial in the 
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world of  competitive elitism, and political elites seek to establish control across different 
spheres of  society. Under professional pluralism, by contrast, elites are generally profes-
sionally demarcated and separate. They tend to be selected (or self-selected) on the basis 
of  professional merit and may be highly exclusive of  non-professionals. 
The main task of  the present paper is to establish if  existing elite models in Iceland 
are supported by data on elite composition. This means, on one hand, studying the 
historical trends of  elite composition and, on the other hand, devoting special attention 
to present-day elites. Existing literature leads us to believe that traditional elitism was 
predominant in the early twentieth century, but was at least partly replaced during the 
inter-war period by competitive elitism. In recent decades, we expect to see clear signs 
of  professional pluralism. However, the extent to which we should observe remnants of  
earlier power structures remains uncertain and, to a certain extent, contested.
Our expectations are derived from existing research. With regard to the historical 
part of  our data, we expect to find evidence of  traditional elitism (social exclusiveness 
and high status) in the earliest observations, subsequently giving way to competitive elit-
ism during the mid-twentieth century and professional pluralism as the century drew to 
an end. In the survey data (obtained in 2015), we expect to find evidence of  professional 
pluralism with professionally exclusive elites, recruitment based on professional merit 
and a fragmented overall elite structure based on professional clusters.
3. Data
Elites are small groups or minorities which are in a position to influence important out-
comes by virtue of  control over resources. By adopting this approach, we follow in the 
footsteps of  the Danish power study, in which the focus was on power as capacity, rath-
er than its exercise. Christiansen et al. (2001) justify their strategy not by claiming that 
the resources are more important than other power-related phenomena but that they 
are often likely to be a ‘reasonably good indicator of  the actual exercise of  power’ (12). 
The positional method seems to have become the standard approach for studying 
elites (Hoffmann-Lange 2006, 4). This method has been used in all the Nordic power 
studies (e.g. Christiansen et al. 2001, 13; Petersson et al. 1990, 309). The Nordic elite 
studies differ in their data collection methods, with surveys and interviews playing a key 
role in the Norwegian, Swedish and Finnish cases, while the Danish study was based on 
the coding of  existing information. The present study relies on two main sources of  
data. One is historical. Several attempts have been made to map Icelandic elites in the 
twentieth century, in particular politicians (e.g. Kristjánsson 1994) and officials (Kristins-
son 1994). In addition to this, we have gathered biographical information on Icelandic 
MPs from the period 1917–2016. Further, we have used existing sources, including the 
Alþingi web, several reference books and obituaries, to code information on their back-
grounds and careers.1
The second source is a survey of  eight present-day elites, conducted in 2015. Using 
a research design influenced by the Nordic power studies, we divide the groups in a 







of  dividing elites into eight groups – the political, administrative, judicial, organizational, 
business, media, academic and cultural elites. The eight elite groups were identified fol-
lowing similar criteria as those used in the Danish elite study of  2001 (Christiansen et 
al. 2001). The political elite was identified as MPs, ministers and other leading members 
of  the political parties. The administrative elite was defined as senior ministry officials, 
heads of  public agencies and top executives of  the largest municipalities. The judicial 
elite comprise Supreme Court judges and chairs of  municipal courts. The organizational 
elite consists mainly of  leading persons from the sectoral and labour market organiza-
tions. The business elite includes the directors of  larger companies and chairmen as well 
as senior officers of  the very largest ones. The media elite consists of  editors and senior 
executives as well as known media personalities. The academic elite consists of  univer-
sity directors and influential scientists (academic impact). The cultural elite comprises 
chief  administrators and influential artists in major fields. Special advice (reputational 
method) was obtained for mapping the media, academic and cultural elites from strategi-
cally placed individuals. For each of  the elites, we seek information on how distinct they 
are (exclusiveness), how people get to become ‘members’ (selection criteria) and to what 
extent they actually function as interconnected groups of  people (network connections). 
A highly elitist structure is likely to be characterized by a high degree of  exclusiveness, 
narrowly conceived selection criteria and a high degree of  interconnectedness.
Members of  the elites were asked to participate in a survey concerning their back-
grounds, careers and networks. 
Table 2. Response rate for a survey among elites, 2015
Elite Members Respondents Response rate (%)
Political 73 54 74.0
Administrative 254 119 46.9
Judicial 19 11 57.9
Organizational 126 64 50.8
Business 140 62 44.3
Media 79 42 54.1
Academic 66 51 77.3
Cultural 89 50 56.2
Total 846 453 53.5
According to this 2015 estimate, the Icelandic elites comprise 846 individuals. They are 
smaller than the Scandinavian ones, which typically total around 2,000 persons, accord-
ing to the power studies (Christiansen et al. 2001; Peterson 1990), and much smaller 
than estimates for larger countries (e.g. around 5,000 in Australia, France and Germany 
and over 10,000 in the United States, according to Best & Higley 2010, 6-7). While we 
followed the methods used by the Danish power study closely, we obtained an elite just 
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under half  the size of  the Danish one in a society numbering approximately 6% of  the 
Danish population. We have no way of  measuring the accuracy of  our elite definition. 
We can only note that there may be a tendency for elites to be relatively larger in smaller 
societies – which fits the notion that the social distance between those in power and the 
public is often small in smaller societies (Corbet 2015).
The overall response rate for the survey was 53.5%, ranging from 44.3% in the case 
of  the business elite to 77.3% among the academic elite. In the following analysis, we 
treat the judicial and administrative elites as a single group in order to avoid problems 
related to the small size of  the judicial elite. This may affect the analysis of  the adminis-
trative elite slightly, but the two are similar in many respects.
4. Elite openness and ascriptive status
An important method for assessing elite openness is to consider ascriptive status, which 
refers to those aspects of  a person’s social position which – unlike achieved status – are 
determined more or less at birth. In a closed elite system, gender and parental status are 
likely to affect people’s chances of  achieving elite positions. In an open system, by con-
trast, such factors are of  smaller importance, although in highly meritocratic systems, 
there may exist relationships between parental status and offspring performance as well. 
Such relationships, however, should be relatively modest in open systems, and higher in 
closed ones. In the present context, we seek evidence of  elite openness with regard to 
social exclusiveness, gender and professional exclusiveness.
Social exclusiveness. In the absence of  more complete information, we use paternal 
education as an indicator of  social exclusiveness. This probably works quite well for the 
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Graph 1. Openness of political elites: Paternal education (% of elite groups) 
At the beginning of the period, MPs are mostly the sons of either farmers or officials. A 
careful reading of the material indicates that although the composition of the Alþingi in 
1917 was biased towards the upper echelons of society, there was, considering the elitist 
model, a surprisingly large number of self-made men, who had risen from modest origins. 
Being a member of the Alþingi, nonetheless, was not something any member of society 
could afford. It was by no means a full-time occupation, and members of the assembly had 
to have flexible incomes and working hours. During the second half of the twentieth 
century, the share of those coming from less educated homes declined, while the share of 
those with intermediary education increased. The share of MPs coming from a university-
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early years, when paternal status more or less determined that of  the family. In more re-
cent years, maternal education may, in some cases, complicate things, but on the whole, 
we are confident that paternal education captures the essential features of  ascriptive 
social status. First, we look at the historical development of  the political elite.
At the beginning of  the period, MPs are mostly the sons of  either farmers or of-
ficials. A careful reading of  the material indicates that although the composition of  the 
Alþingi in 1917 was biased towards the upper echelons of  society, there was, consider-
ing the elitist model, a surprisingly large number of  self-made men, who had risen from 
modest origins. Being a member of  the Alþingi, nonetheless, was not something any 
member of  society could afford. It was by no means a full-time occupation, and mem-
bers of  the assembly had to have flexible incomes and working hours. During the sec-
ond half  of  the twentieth century, the share of  those coming from less educated homes 
declined, while the share of  those with intermediary education increased. The share of  
MPs coming from a university-educated paternal background does not begin to increase 
again until after the turn of  the century.
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Graph 2. Openness of elites: Mean paternal education of elites in 2015: low (= 0) to high 
(= 1)2 
On the whole, the elites in 2015 do not belong to an exclusive social group, judging by 
the survey results. Almost a quarter of the elite groups come from families with little 
paternal education, while just over one third have university (i.e. highly) educated fathers. 
Yet the greatest number come from a family background of intermediary education. 
Individuals from the world of organized interests and business score slightly lower than 
the other groups, but the variations are small overall.  
Gender exclusion 
An important dimension of elite exclusiveness concerns gender. Gender is likely to 
reflect the openness of elite structures, in the sense that more open structures are likely 
to be more accessible to women. Table 5 shows the composition of the Alþingi from 
1917 to 2016 with regard to gender. 
 
                                                 
2 Note: Education was measured on a scale where low education = 0, intermediary = 0.5 
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paternal education, while just over one third have iversity (i.e. highly) educated fathers. 
Yet the greatest number come from a family background of  intermediary education. 
Individuals from the world of  org nized interests and business score slightly lower than 
the other groups, but the variations are small overall. 
Gender exclusion
An important dimension of  elite exclusiveness concerns gender. Gender is likely to re-
flect the openness of  elite structures, in the sense that more open structures are likely to 
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be more accessible to women. Table 5 shows the composition of  the Alþingi from 1917 
to 2016 with regard to gender.
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Graph 3. Openness of elites: Gender of MPs, 1917–2016 (% male) 
 
Although women obtained the right to vote in parliamentary elections in Iceland in 1915, 
the Alþingi remained male-dominated until relatively recently. At the beginning of this 
century, the proportion of women had not yet reached one third, although by 2016, it was 
close to half. According to this, women are close to reaching an equal position to men with 
regard to political careers, although part of this result has been obtained through the 
introduction of gender quotas in some political parties. Similar developments at the local 
level (Kristinsson 2014, 53) indicate, however, that politics no longer remains the exclusive 
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Graph 3. Openness of elites: Gender of MPs, 1917–2016 (% male)
Although women obtained the right to vote in parliamentary elections in Iceland in 
1915, the Alþingi remained male-dominated until relatively recently. At the beginning of  
this century, the pr portion of women had not yet reached on  third, although by 20 6
i  was close to half. According to this, women are close to reaching an equal p sition
to men with regard to political careers, although part of  t is result has een obtained 
through the introduction of  gender quotas in some political parties. Similar develop-
ments at the local level (Kristinsson 2014, 53) indicate, however, that politics no longer 
remains the exclusive domain of  males and has become quite open to members of  both 
sexes.
The survey results indicate that the political and cultural elites are less male-domi-
nated than other elites, although males constitute the majority in both. The economic 
elite is most heavily dominated by males, followed by the academic elite. When con-
sidered together, almost two-thirds of  the Icelandic elites consist of  males, compared 
to 35% females. While this is likely to reflect a considerable improvement in female 
representation compared to earlier periods, and even a comparatively favourable situa-
tion compared to other states, it nonetheless shows that Icelandic elites are not gender 
neutral. The proportion of  women among the Icelandic elites is higher than in the 
Nordic elite surveys (i.e. 35.3% compared to 12–26%), but the time lag – with the Ice-







however, is broadly similar, in that women in the Nordic countries are best represented 
in the political elite, followed by the cultural elite, but least in the business elite (Ru-
ostetsaari 2007).
Bearing in mind that the share of  women in the Icelandic political elite has improved 
considerably in recent decades, the question arises if  the gender imbalance of  Icelandic 
elites may, to some extent, reflect age and elite renewal. Thus, it seems possible that elite 
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Graph 4. Openness of elites: Gender of Icelandic elites in 2015 
 
The survey results indicate that the political and cultural elites are less male-dominated 
than other elites, although males constitute the majority in both. The economic elite is 
most heavily dominated by males, followed by the academic elite. When considered 
together, almost two-thirds of the Icelandic elites consist of males, compared to 35% 
females. While this is likely to reflect a considerable improvement in female representation 
compared to earlier periods, and even a comparatively favourable situation compared to 
other states, it nonetheless shows that Icelandic elites are not gender neutral. The 
proportion of women among the Icelandic elites is higher than in the Nordic elite surveys 
(i.e. 35.3% compared to 12–26%), but the time lag – with the Icelandic one being more 
recent – may account for some of the difference. The pattern, however, is broadly similar, 
in that women in the Nordic countries are best represented in the political elite, followed 
by the cultural elite, but least in the business elite (Ruostetsaari 2007). 
Bearing in mind that the share of women in the Icelandic political elite has improved 
considerably in recent decades, the question arises if the gender imbalance of Icelandic 
elites may, to some extent, reflect age and elite renewal. Thus, it seems possible that elite 
recruitment was more imbalanced two or three decades ago than in recent years, which 
should be reflected in a greater imbalance among older elite cohorts, and a smaller one 
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Graph 5. Openness of elites: Female members of Icelandic elites in 2015 by age (% of 
age cohort) 
Women represent between 46% and 63% of elite members below 50 years across elite 
groups. This indicates that the system has moved quite swiftly in an egalitarian direction in 
the last three decades. The major reason for the gender imbalance is male-dominated 
recruitment among older generations. In the age group under 50, women are the majority 
of the administrative, cultural and organizational elites, while close to half the members of 
the political, business and academic elites are women. This may indicate that recruitment 
may already have become quite equal, and a greater gender balance will emerge within a 
few years. Given the relatively small number of respondents in some cases, the figures 
should be interpreted with caution. 
Professional exclusiveness 
In an open elite system, we should expect parental occupation to be weakly related to elite 
status. Elites should be accessible to people from different social groups. A certain degree 
of parental influence, however, is compatible with an open elite structure, in the sense that 
parents may simply influence the attitudes and motivations of their offspring, rather than 
opportunities. 
In the political sphere, there are well-known examples of ‘political families’, where MPs 
are either the sons or daughters of parliamentarians or belong to the same extended family 
as others who have sat in parliament. Political families or dynasties are a well-known 
feature of many political systems, and the Icelandic one is no exception. Family ties to 
other parliamentarians are listed on the Alþingi home page. Our data indicate that in 1917, 
10% of members had parents with parliamentary experience, while lower figures prevail in 
subsequent years, ranging from 5% in 1965 to 9% in 1988. In 2016, 6% of members had 
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recruitment was more imbalanced two or three decades ago than in recent years, which 
should be reflected in a greater imbalance among older elite cohorts, and a smaller one 
among younger ones. 
Women represent between 46% and 63% of  elite members below 50 years across 
elite groups. This indicates that the system has moved quite swiftly in an egalitarian 
direction in the last three decades. The major reason for the gender imbalance is male-
dominated recruitment among older generations. In the age group under 50, women are 
the majority of  the administrative, cultural and organizational elites, while close to half  
the members of  the political, business and academic elites are women. This may indicate 
that recruitment may already have become quite equal, and a greater gender balance will 
emerge within a few years. Given the relatively small number of  respondents in some 
cases, the figures should be interpreted with caution.
Professional exclusiveness
In an open elite system, we should expect parental occupation to be weakly related to 
elite status. Elites should be accessible to people from different social groups. A certain 
degree of  parental influence, however, is compatible with an open elite structure, in the 
sense that parents may simply influence the attitudes and motivations of  their offspring, 
rather than opportunities.
In the political sphere, there are well-known examples of  ‘political families’, where 
MPs are either the sons or daughters of  parliamentarians or belong to the same ex-
tended family as others who have sat in parliament. Political families or dynasties are 
a well-known feature of  many political systems, and the Icelandic one is no exception. 
Family ties to other parliamentarians are listed on the Alþingi home page. Our data in-
dicate that in 1917, 10% of  members had parents with parliamentary experience, while 
Table 3. Paternal careers: % of respondents in each elite group with fathers 














Politics 17.3 14.8 8.1 5.0 2.4 8.2 8.3
Public service 48.1 35.2 21.0 18.3 26.8 26.5 29.2
Interest groups 19.2 11.7 12.9 6.7 7.3 10.2 29.2
Private sector 38.5 46.9 46.8 55.0 34.1 36.7 29.2
Media  5.8  3.1 0.0  1.7  14.6  4.1  8.3
Academia 7.7 7.8 4.8 10.0 12.2 16.3 14.6
Culture and arts 5.8 3.1 0.0 1.7 14.6 4.1 8.3
Note: Figures should be read downwards, but they add up to more than 100% because more than one 







lower figures prevail in subsequent years, ranging from 5% in 1965 to 9% in 1988. In 
2016, 6% of  members had parents with parliamentary experience. According to the 
Danish power study, 10% of  the political elite in 1999 had parents who were politicians 
(Christiansen et al. 2001, 52). According to Grímsson (1976), family ties were a key in-
gredient of  nineteenth-century Icelandic elitism. While there is still some evidence that 
family ties matter, there is no evidence that they are among the defining characteristics 
of  the system.
In Table 3, we turn to paternal careers. Table 3 indicates that paternal occupation 
has some influence on elite composition. The political and administrative elites come 
disproportionally from a public service environment, and they are also more likely than 
others to have fathers in politics. The business elite is raised disproportionally in a pri-
vate-sector environment. The media, academic and cultural elites, similarly, dispropor-
tionally have an intelligentsia background. On the whole, however, we see little evidence 
that the Icelandic elites are closed to new generations or provide strong advantages to 
their own offspring. The strongest influence is in the business elite, where 55% have 
fathers in private-sector occupations. Bearing in mind that the majority of  economi-
cally active persons belong to the private sector, this is difficult to interpret as a sign of  
exclusiveness.
The indicators of  the openness vs. exclusiveness of  Icelandic elites seem to suggest 
that Iceland, on the whole, is characterized by a relatively open elite structure. Even with 
regard to gender, where there are still considerable disproportionalities in elite composi-
tion, the effect seems to be primarily generational, as the gender ratios are relatively even 
among younger generations. By comparison with other societies, gender differences in 
Iceland are probably modest. According to the Global Gender Gap Report 2016, Ice-
land is the most gender-equal society in the world (World Economic Forum 2016).
5. Selection principles
Different systems of  elite rule use different types of  selection principles. Traditional 
elitism is based, above all, on social status as a qualifying criterion for elite membership. 
High social status may pave the way for personal advancement even when it is irrelevant 
to the position in question. People sometimes enter politics, for example, owing to their 
high social status, even if  they have no relevant background indicating political com-
petence. Under competitive elitism, however, we would expect political experience to be a 
major selection criterion, along with a proven record of  service to the party. It is relevant 
not only to a political career but to any elite position, given the party political nature 
of  elite competition. Finally, under professional pluralism, we expect relevant educational 
training and career patterns to be decisive.
Social status
Social status is a complex phenomenon which, in most cases, can only be measured 
through proxies. In the present case, we use education as an indicator of  social status. 
Although the two – education and social status – are clearly not the same, education is 
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likely to enhance social status, and social status may enhance educational opportunities. 
The nature of  the elite structure may, nonetheless, affect the influence of  education 
on the attainability of  elite membership. Both traditional elitism and professional plu-
ralism are likely to emphasize education as a selection criterion for elite membership. 
In the case of  traditional elitism, this may reflect a position of  privilege, while under 
professional pluralism, high educational attainment is closely connected to meritocratic 
ideals. Competitive elitism, however, is less concerned with academic achievement. Its 
core selection criterion is party loyalty, which can easily be achieved without academic 
qualifications. 
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Graph 6. Selection principles: Education of MPs, 1917–2016, and general population 18 
years and older, 1981–2016 (% with university education)3 
Graph 6 shows several things of interest. First, there are substantial differences between 
the educational levels of MPs and the general population. Although the two groups are not 
wholly comparable in age (hardly any between 18 and 23 have a university education), it is 
quite clear that for much of the twentieth century, the share of the university-educated 
population was well below 10%, while among MPs, it hovered around 50%. In all 
likelihood, the proportion of university graduates among MPs was at least 10 times that of 
university graduates among the general population. Second, a steep rise in the number of 
persons with a university education takes place around 1980 among both MPs and the 
general population. Consequently, the relative advantage of a university education reduced 
for MPs, from around 10 times as many (or possibly more) with university education to 
around three times as many. Although this is still a significant difference, in relative terms, 
it indicates a decline in the elite character of MPs as a group with regard to education. 
Third, the rise in the number of university graduates among politicians indicates the 
growing importance of university education for a political career, and can thus be seen as 
an indicator of the growing importance of meritocratic qualifications. 
 
 
                                                 
3 Information on education of population at large obtained from Statistics Iceland, courtesy of 
Ómar Harðarson. The data is published on the understanding that it is incomplete and may 
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Graph 6 shows several things of  interest. First, there are substantial differences between 
the educational levels of  MPs and the general population. Although the two groups are 
not wholly comparable in age (hardly any between 18 and 23 have a university educa-
tion), it is quite clear that for much of  the twentieth century, the share of  the university-
educated population was well below 10%, while among MPs, it hovered around 50%. In 
all likelihood, the proportion of  university graduates among MPs was at least 10 times 
that of  university graduates among the general population. Second, a steep rise in the 
number of  persons with a university education takes place around 1980 among both 
MPs and the general population. Consequently, the relative advantage of  a university 
education reduced for MPs, from around 10 times as many (or possibly more) with 







difference, in relative terms, it indicates a decline in the elite character of  MPs as a group 
with regard to education. Third, the rise in the number of  university graduates among 
politicians indicates the growing importance of  university education for a political ca-
reer, and can thus be seen as an indicator of  the growing importance of  meritocratic 
qualifications.
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Graph 7. Selection principles: Self-reported education of elites according to the 2015 
survey (% with university degrees) 
 
On average, over 90% of members of the Icelandic elites are university educated. The only 
elites among whom university education is not almost universal are the organizational 
ones, representing a diversity of sectoral and labour-market interests. The academic and 
administrative elites consist almost exclusively of university graduates, and even the 
political and media elites are heavily dominated by such groups. This suggests that 
meritocratic norms are important in the Icelandic elite system. Professional pluralism 
prevails in this respect. 
Political background  
Political background, such as experience of party work or local government, is an 
important element in competitive elitism. Party work is especially important, as local 
government is less party political and may reflect broader community status, in line with 
traditional elitism. Hence, we should expect people with little or no political experience to 
be prominent in the earlier political elites, while persons with experience of party work 
should be gaining ground from the mid-twentieth century onwards. During the period of 
professional pluralism after the turn of the century, political experience becomes less 
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rage, over 90% of  embers of  the Icelandic lites are university educated. The 
only elites among whom university education is not almost universal are the organiza-
tional ones, representing a diversity of  sectoral and labour-market interests. The aca-
demic and administrative elites consist almost exclusively of  university graduates, and 
even the political and media elites are heavily dominated by such groups. This suggests 
that meritocratic norms are important in the Icelandic elite system. Professional plural-
ism prevails in this respect.
ti l ackground 
Politic l background, such as experience of  party work or local gover ment, is an im-
portant element in competitive elitism. Party work is especially important, as local gov-
ernment is less party political and may reflect broader community status, in line with tra-
ditional elitism. Hence, we should expect people with little or no political experience to 
be prominent in the earlier political elites, while persons with experience of  party work 
should be gaining ground from the mid-twentieth century onwards. During the period 
of  professional pluralism after the turn of  the century, political experience becomes less 
important. The data are presented in Graph 8.
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Graph 8. Selection principles: Political background of MPs, 1917–2016 (% of group with 
relevant experience [non-cumulative]) 
The graph shows the proportion of MPs with no known political background prior to 
entering parliament, those with a background in local government and those who have 
served representative roles in party organizations. The data seem to partly confirm the 
prevalence of traditional elitism at the earliest point, where politicians either had no 
political connections before entering parliament or can be considered as local dignitaries. 
The data also reveal the growing significance of political experience from party 
organizations from the middle of the twentieth century onwards, in line with our 
expectations based on the competitive elitism perspective. Although the share of persons 
with party political experience has decreased to a certain extent in 2016, we find that they 
remain a relatively large proportion of MPs. Despite the emergence of new political 
movements and an extremely rapid rate of turnover in parliament since 2007, almost two-
thirds of MPs have at least some experience of performing a representative role in the 
party organizations. This is lower than in 1988, but it is still the second-highest proportion 
in the data. This may indicate that competitive elitism remains an important element in the 
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The graph shows the proportion of  MPs with no known political background prior to 
entering parliament, those with a background in local government and those who have 
served representative roles in party organizations. The data seem to partly confirm the 
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Graph 9. Selection principles: Elite connections to political parties in 2015 (% of elite 
groups who have been non-attached to parties, party members or served leading 
positions in the parties) 
Apart from the political elite, the organizational and business elites are the most politicized 
of the elite groups. These groups were, in many ways, the backbone of party support during 
the heyday of competitive elitism. The private sector was associated with the Independence 
Party, the Progressive Party (PP – Centre – agrarian), farmers and the co-operative 
movement, and the left-wing parties competed among themselves and with the 
Independence Party for leadership in the trade union movement. If we look closer at the 













Political Administrative Organizational Business Media Academic Culture
Non-attached Party members Leading positions
r  . Selection principles: Elite onnecti ns to political parties in 2015 (% of 
elite groups who have been non-attached to parties, party members or served 







prevalence of  traditional elitism at the earliest point, where politicians either had no po-
litical connections before entering parliament or can be considered as local dignitaries. 
The data also reveal the growing significance of  political experience from party organi-
zations from the middle of  the twentieth century onwards, in line with our expectations 
based on the competitive elitism perspective. Although the share of  persons with party 
political experience has decreased to a certain extent in 2016, we find that they remain a 
relatively large proportion of  MPs. Despite the emergence of  new political movements 
and an extremely rapid rate of  turnover in parliament since 2007, almost two-thirds 
of  MPs have at least some experience of  performing a representative role in the party 
organizations. This is lower than in 1988, but it is still the second-highest proportion in 
the data. This may indicate that competitive elitism remains an important element in the 
Icelandic power structure, at least when it comes to the recruitment of  political elites.
Apart from the political elite, the organizational and business elites are the most 
politicized of  the elite groups. These groups were, in many ways, the backbone of  party 
support during the heyday of  competitive elitism. The private sector was associated with 
the Independence Party, the Progressive Party (PP – Centre – agrarian), farmers and the 
co-operative movement, and the left-wing parties competed among themselves and with 
the Independence Party for leadership in the trade union movement. If  we look closer 
at the respondents who have been members of  political parties, we obtain Graph 10.
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Graph 10. Selection principles: Elite connections to political parties (% of elite who 
are/have been party members4)  
The only elite group in which all parties are well-represented is the political elite. Others 
are either highly skewed, such as the administrative, organizational and business elites, or 
less politicized, such as the media, academic and cultural elites. 
Two of the parties are more closely associated with the elites than others – namely, the 
Independence Party and the Social Democratic Alliance (SDA – Social Democrats). The 
Independence Party is very strong among the business elite and well-represented in the 
organizational, political and administrative elites as well. It is less well-represented in the 
three elites which may broadly be termed the intelligentsia – that is, the media, academic 
and cultural elites. Graph 10 gives us reason to believe that IP is the party of the Icelandic 
establishment, as it is well-represented near the centre of political and economic power, 
but less well in intellectual and cultural circles. The cultural elite is less a part of the 
establishment, being more left-wing oriented than the other elites and the only elite apart 
from the political one where ‘others’ constitute a substantial proportion of the elite 
members. Apart from IP, SDA is the only party which can claim a sizeable presence in all 
the elites, although its share of the business elite is small. The left socialist Left Greens 
                                                 
4 Note: The SDA includes the Social Democratic Party, People´s Alliance, Þjóðvaki, Bandalag 
jafnaðarmanna. Non-attached elite members are not represented in the graph for the sake of simplicity but 
they constitute 7.8% of the political elite, 59.2% of the administrative elite, 38.3% of the organizational elite, 
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The only elite group in which all parties are well-represented is the political elite. Others 
are either highly skewed, such s the administrative, organizational and business elites, 
or less politicized, such as the media, academic and cultural elites.
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Two of  the parties are more closely associated with the elites than others – namely, 
the Independence Party and the Social Democratic Alliance (SDA – Social Democrats). 
The Independence Party is very strong among the business elite and well-represented in 
the organizational, political and administrative elites as well. It is less well-represented 
in the three elites which may broadly be termed the intelligentsia – that is, the media, 
academic and cultural elites. Graph 10 gives us reason to believe that IP is the party of  
the Icelandic establishment, as it is well-represented near the centre of  political and 
economic power, but less well in intellectual and cultural circles. The cultural elite is less 
a part of  the establishment, being more left-wing oriented than the other elites and the 
only elite apart from the political one where ‘others’ constitute a substantial proportion 
of  the elite members. Apart from IP, SDA is the only party which can claim a sizeable 
presence in all the elites, although its share of  the business elite is small. The left socialist 
Left Greens (LG) are weakly represented among elite groups, although stronger among 
the political and cultural elites than elsewhere.
On the whole, the elites’ relationship to political parties indicates that competitive 
elitism remains a feature of  the Icelandic elite system. A large proportion of  elite mem-
bers have some political experience. The majority, however, in the administrative, media, 
academic and cultural elites have never been registered in a political party. The business 
and organizational elites are more politicized and both lean towards IP, although a size-
able minority in the organizational elite has belonged to the Social Democrats. Graph 10 
indicates that there may be a cultural gap in Icelandic politics between the political and 
economic establishments, where IP is in a leading position, and the intelligentsia, which 
is more evenly balanced politically. 
Professionalism 
To seek evidence of  professionalism among the Icelandic elites, we look for a match 
between education and careers. Among the political elite, degrees in law and the social 
sciences have been prominent, with the latter gaining ground in recent decades (a joint 
share of  close to 30% since the 1960s), but the former receding somewhat (peaking at 
32.8% in 1965). The share of  technical and related subjects has consistently remained 
close to 20%. 







There are no big surprises in Graph 11. Among the political elite, we find a high share 
of  the social sciences, including law, as well as humanities and education. Among the 
administrative elite, law and some other social sciences are highly prevalent. The organi-
zational and business elites reflect a large share of  economics and business education. 
Education in social sciences and humanities is common in the media elite, while the 
natural and health sciences are strongly represented in the academic elite, but the share 
of  social sciences and economics is relatively small. Arts and the humanities completely 
predominate among the cultural elite. The relatively large male presence among the aca-
demic elite is partly attributable to the privileged position of  male-dominated subjects, 
such as technical and natural sciences, among the academic elite. 
There seems to be no doubt that the educational profiles of  elites broadly fit their 
chosen careers rather well. Members of  the elites have largely chosen relevant education 
early in life and gone on to forge successful careers on that basis. The role of  general-
ists, nonetheless, varies to some extent among elites. If  we define generalists as persons 
who have made more than one career, these are far more common in politics than in 
other spheres, followed by administration and culture. The number of  careers can be 
estimated on the basis of  a question asking respondents to indicate if  they had worked 
for at least two years in any of  the eight different areas addressed in the elite survey. 
On average, the respondents had close to two careers according to this measurement. 
Career specialization is smallest among politicians (2.83 careers) and the cultural and 
administrative elites (2.06 and 2.00, respectively). Career specialization is greatest among 
the business elite (1.58) and rather high among the organizational, media and academic 
elites as well (1.77, 1.79 and 1.72, respectively). Despite the professionalization of  poli-
tics since 1970, the data indicate that is at a lower level than among the other careers. 
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(LG) are weakly represented among elite groups, although stronger among the political 
and cultural elites than elsewhere. 
On the whole, the elites’ relationship to political parties indicates that competitive elitism 
remains a feature of the Icelandic elite system. A large proportion of elite members have 
some political experience. The majority, however, in the administrative, media, academic 
and cultural elites have never been registered in a political party. The business and 
organizational elites are more politicized and both lean towards IP, although a sizeable 
minority in the organizational elite has belonged to the Social Democrats. Graph 10 
indicates that there may be a cultural gap in Icelandic politics between the political and 
economic establishments, where IP is in a leading position, and the intelligentsia, which is 
more evenly balanced politically.  
Professionalism  
To seek evidence of professionalism among the Icelandic elites, we look for a match 
between education and careers. Among the political elite, degrees in law and the social 
sciences have been prominent, with the latter gaining ground in recent decades (a joint 
share of close to 30% since the 1960s), but the former receding somewhat (peaking at 
32.8% in 1965). The share of technical and related subjects has consistently remained 
close to 20%.  
Graph 11 shows the share of different subjects among different elites in 2015. 
 
 
Graph 11. Selection principles: Elite education (% of subject areas among elite groups) 
There are no big surprises in Graph 11. Among the political elite, we find a high share of 
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Social networks form an important mechanism of  elite power, and they may differ from 
one elite structure to another. Traditional elitism presupposes a single, cohesive elite 
with close connections across different spheres of  society. Competitive elitism presup-
poses the centrality of  plural political elites which compete for influence across different 
spheres. Professional pluralism is likely to be characterized by the importance of  intra-
elite connections, but weak ties across elites. Weak ties, if  there are enough of  them, 
may nonetheless be an important resource, according to Granovetter (1973). Hence, the 
relative position of  elites may be affected to a significant degree by their reach across 
elite spheres.
In analysing the network patterns of  elites, we seek information which is likely to 
reflect how connections are structured on one hand, and how they constitute a useful 
resource of  elite power, on the other hand. We start by studying place of  residence as a 
rough indicator of  network structures, but then move on to more direct indicators of  
network patterns and the importance of  network connections.
Residence
Around two-thirds of  the Icelandic population live in the greater Reykjavík area, which 
is divided into several municipalities, with the majority living in Reykjavík. The choice of  
residence may be indicative of  lifestyle preferences, but also of  the geographical disper-
sion of  important social ties. In popular culture, there exist strong images of  the ‘latte-
sipping’ cultural elite residing in central Reykjavík and business moguls living in spacious 
accommodations in the expensive suburbs of  Garðabær and Seltjarnarnes. 
















Central Reykjavík 22.2 28.5 15.6 10.2 45.2 28.0 61.7 28.5
Garðabær and 
Seltjarnarnes 13.0 10.8 12.5 33.9 4.8 10.0 6.4 13.2
Reykjavík 
area other 35.2 33.9 45.4 42,3 45.2 50.0 29.8 39.3



















The cultural and media elites live almost exclusively in Reykjavík, with a clear preference 
for central locations. Reykjavík is very much at the centre of  cultural life and media 
events. The business elite lives disproportionally in suburbia, with over a third in Garða-
bær and Seltjarnarnes. The fact that parliament, leadership of  the central administration 
and headquarters of  most organizations are in Reykjavík may provide strong opportuni-







ganizational elites live in substantial numbers outside the Reykjavík area – but even here, 
the regions (with roughly 1/3 of  the population) are underrepresented. Residence and 
place of  work may be a relevant factor of  elite integration in Iceland, but more direct 
information may be obtained by studying data on social interaction patterns.
Social interaction
The social world is lumpy, in the sense that contacts and connections are concentrated in 
places and unequal across layers and spheres of  society. In fact, there is nothing particu-
larly suspicious about such lumps. They reflect commonalities of  interest and tastes as 
well as the practicalities of  cooperation outside the structures of  formal organizations. 
They are likely to contribute substantially to the creation of  social capital (Coleman 
1988). At the same time, such connections may constitute an important power resource, 
in the sense that they help actors produce intended effects. Contacts facilitate coopera-
tion. Hence, for the study of  power structures, it is important to learn where contact 
patterns lie. In the present case, we are interested in the extent to which they are focused 
within elite spheres and reach across such spheres.
The data on social interaction come from a question in the elite survey on social net-
works. What we are looking for is, on one hand, the volume of  intra-elite contacts and, 
on the other hand, between elites. These data are presented in Graph 12.
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and reach across such spheres. 
 
The data on social interaction come from a question in the elite survey on social networks. 
What we are looking for is, on one hand, the volume of intra-elite contacts and, on the 




Graph 12. Network patterns: With whom elites socialize (mean [%] inward and outward 
socializing5) 
                                                 
5 Note: The means show % of respondents claiming to socialize very much, much or rather 
a lot with group. Inward refers to % socializing with people in same sphere (e.g. % of 
political elite socializing with people in politics) while outward refers to mean % claiming 
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r 2. Network patterns: With whom el tes soci lize (me n [%] inwa and 
outward socializing5)
The political elite is the most outward looking, followed closely by the media elite. The 
most inward looking are the business and academic elites, followed by the cultural elite. 
All elites are highly focused on their own sphere when it comes to socializing. Between 
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72% and 95% socialize very much, much or rather a lot with people from their own 
sector. This indicates that the elites form fairly exclusive and professionalized groups.
A different way of  approaching these data is to look for significant others – other 
groups which the elites are most likely to socialize with. Only the organizational elite 
socializes more with businesspeople than others from the organizational sector, which 
is, of  course, partly overlapping in the case of  the business elite. The business elite is 
well-represented in the social networks of  all elites, as is the academic elite. This may 
indicate a certain centrality of  the business and academic sectors among elites, but they 
nonetheless weigh far less than internal elite contacts. In the case of  the political elite, 
public administrators are the most significant external contacts.
The political elite is not centrally located, according to the data on socializing. Politi-
cians weigh relatively little in the contact patterns of  other elites. They have the greatest 
contacts with the organizational world and media, which is hardly surprising, given the 
nature of  their work. They weigh least in the patterns of  the academic (11%) and cul-
tural (2%) elites.
Taken together, the data provide support for a professional pluralist interpretation 
(emphasis on intra-elite contacts), but less for competitive elitism (contacts across elites 
via political connections). What is still missing, however, is an evaluation of  how useful 
the contacts are.
Usefulness of connections
Icelanders often portray their society as an arena where personal contacts and cronies 
are decisive in many walks of  life. Statistically, however, the likelihood of  random in-
dividuals knowing each other well is extremely small, even in such a small society. In 
traditional elitism, personal ties (especially kinship ties and other acquaintance) are likely 
to be highly important. In competitive elitism, political connections should be very im-
portant, while in professional pluralism, professional contacts are likely to be more im-
portant than others. 
How respondents to the elite survey evaluated the usefulness of  different types of  
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Graph 13. Network patterns: How useful do elite groups feel connections have been to 
their careers? All elites claiming connections to be often useful (% of elite)6 
The general pattern is clearly that professional and business connections are of paramount 
importance to the elites, whereas more personalized connections, such as kinship or local 
ones, are less important. In between, we find general ‘acquaintance’ and connections from 
voluntary organizations. They are likely to belong to general network ties, which are part 
of any social structure. An interesting feature is the generally low importance of political 
connections, indicating that the political elite has a far weaker position in the power 
structure than would be expected, according to stronger versions of competitive elitism.  
 
  
                                                 





























r  3. Network patterns: How useful do elite groups feel connectio s have 
been to their car ers? All elites laiming connections to be often useful (% of 
elite)6
The general pattern is clearly that professional and business connections are of  paramount 
importance to the elites, whereas more personalized connections, such as kinship or local 
ones, are less important. In between, we find general ‘acquaintance’ and connections from 
v luntary organizations. They are likely to belong to general netw rk ties, which are part 
of  any soci l structur . An interesting feature is the generally l w i or anc  of  politi-
cal connections, indicating that the political elite has a far weaker position in the power 
structure than would be expected, according to stronger versions of  competitive elitism. 
Table 5. Proportion of elites reporting connections to be rather often, often or 














Kinship and family 22.5 9.5 16.4 17.6 30.5 6.6 19.5
Local connections 47.9 14.2 13.4 19.3 26.4 7.3 15.0
Acquaintance 42.8 28.3 17.5 17.5 44.4 19.2 39.2
Connections from vol-
untary organizations 55.1 21.0 42.9 35.7 29.3 9.5 36.6
Political connections 51.1 10.2 9.6 19.3 14.3 5.1 7.9
Professional a d busi-
ness connections 63.3 71.6 69.6 77.9 72.2 55.3 76.2
Average 47.1 25.8 28.3 31.2 36.2 17.2 32.4
Note: Figures read downwards can add up to more than 100%.
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Professional and business ties are the most important ties among every elite group. Con-
nections from voluntary organizations are important for all elite groups, although least 
so in the case of  the academic elite, and general acquaintance is relatively important as 
well in all groups. Political connections are of  major importance only in the case of  the 
political elite, although they weigh more in the cases of  the business and media elites 
than in the others. Overall, however, they are of  relatively small importance. 
The political elite is by far the elite which regards contacts with other elites as most 
valuable (47.1% average), with the media, cultural and business elites following. These 
are clearly the more inter-elite network-oriented elite groups. The academic elite is the 
least network-oriented according to this measurement, followed by the administrative 
elite. 
Elite evaluations of  the importance of  different types of  contacts suggest that pro-
fessional pluralism is the predominant model of  elite connections, where professional 
and business ties are the most important ties for all elite groups. They vary, however, in 
the degree to which they consider contacts to other spheres to be important. The most 
outward-oriented of  the elites is clearly the political elite, while the academic elite is least 
so. Yet, while the political elite considers it more important than others to reach beyond 
its own sphere, this gives tenuous support for competitive elitism, since other elites do 
not consider political connections to be particularly important. Political connections, 
along with kinship and local ties, are the least important contacts for other elites, sug-
gesting that both the traditional elite model and competitive elitism are of  secondary 
importance in elite contact networks in Iceland. 
7. Conclusion
Traditional elitism, competitive elitism and professional pluralism have been used as mod-
els of  the Icelandic power structure in the modern period. Traditional elitism, based on 
social exclusion and kinship ties, is seen as characteristic of  the nineteenth and early twen-
tieth centuries. It was replaced by competitive elitism with the development of  modern 
political parties during the inter-war period. Towards the end of  the twentieth century, it is 
hypothesized that the system became increasingly pluralistic, with the role of  political par-
ties receding as professionalism in different areas became increasingly important.
The data examined in this paper are partly historical and partly based on a survey 
conducted in 2015. While we find traces of  traditional elitism at different periods, in-
dicators of  the predominance of  kinship ties and social status in the political elite in 
the early twentieth century are weaker than expected, although elite privilege is clearly 
visible, for instance, when education variables are considered. The strongest indicator, 
however, of  the importance of  ascriptive social status relates to gender. Women were 
largely excluded from the political elite for most of  the twentieth century. 
Competitive elitism was associated with the growing role of  political parties during 
the inter-war period, and a strong party background – suggesting party loyalty – was 
an important part of  a political career during the second half  of  the twentieth century. 
The development of  the political elite is consistent with this interpretation, but we lack 







important among the political elite, although its role has weakened slightly. The relation-
ship of  the political elite to other elites, however, is less consistent with competitive 
elitism. According to competitive elitism, we should expect the political elite to occupy 
a central position – as the elite of  elites – in a network stretching through different sec-
tions of  society. This, however, receives scant support from our 2015 data.
In the early twenty-first century, there are two developments of  considerable interest 
with regard to the impact of  ascriptive status. On one hand, gender differences – although 
they remain considerable in most elites – appear to be decreasing and are probably less sig-
nificant than in most other societies; on the other hand, university education has become 
almost a necessary condition for elite membership in most groups. This, however, goes 
hand in hand with a steep increase in university education in society at large, which means 
that despite the importance of  university education, the elites are not as exclusive with 
regard to education as before. The growing importance of  university education among 
elite groups might be interpreted as compatible with either a model of  social distinction or 
professional achievement. In the context of  the greater availability of  university education, 
a weaker status system and increasing importance of  professional criteria in many spheres 
of  society, however, the latter interpretations seem more plausible. 
Professional pluralism is associated with the prevalence of  distinct elites in different 
enclaves of  society, and the absence of  a dominant elite or close interconnections across 
the elite structure. This seems to characterize the modern-day power structure in Iceland. 
There are indeed strong professional elites in different spheres, but they remain relatively 
open and recruited on the basis of  merit or professional criteria. Even the political elite 
has become professionalized to an increasing extent since the 1970s. But the growth of  
professionalized pluralism is not necessarily an egalitarian trend in all respects. It relies on 
merit criteria for elite selection, such as education, which are closely related to social and 
economic status and inevitably exclude those with weaker credentials. Moreover, while 
gender differences may be expected to recede as the role of  merit increases, the system is 
still gender-biased.
Despite the relatively encouraging findings of  this review of  the Icelandic power struc-
ture, there are important caveats which need to be taken into consideration. The elite 
approach to power is informative concerning some aspects of  the power structure, but 
hardly tells the whole story. It is concerned with power resources and the groups with priv-
ileged access to them. However, it falls short – at least in the present version – of  studying 
the actual exercise of  power, how the decision-making agenda is shaped or how influenc-
ing people’s minds may affect outcomes. The rules of  the game and the participants’ ideas 
about its nature may be skewed in various ways, even if  elite structures are open and plu-
ralistic. Business may, for example, enjoy a privileged status in relation to other interests, 
because of  some pre-conceived ideas about its ultimate importance (Lindblom 1977). In 
the Icelandic case, there is reason to believe that well-established interests associated with 
the primary economy have privileged access to power, even if  this is in no way observ-
able through the composition of  political elites. Having said that, an open, pluralistic and 
meritocratic elite structure is something which most theorists are likely to prefer to closed, 
elitist and privileged ones. 




1 An important limitation of  the historical data is that only one elite is observed and the focus on the 
political aspects of  Icelandic elitism is therefore relatively great. Lack of  resources prevent us from 
including more elites in this part of  the investigation. A more theoretically oriented justification, 
however, is that most authors writing on the subject have strongly emphasized the centrality of  
political elites. 
2 Education was measured on a scale where low education = 0, intermediary = 0.5 and high = 1. The 
graph shows means for each group.  
3 Information on education of  population at large obtained from Statistics Iceland, courtesy of  
Ómar Harðarson. The data is published on the understanding that it is incomplete and may contain 
inaccuracies. 
4 The SDA includes the Social Democratic Party, People´s Alliance, Þjóðvaki, Bandalag jafnaðarman-
na. Non-attached elite members are not represented in the graph for the sake of  simplicity but they 
constitute 7.8% of  the political elite, 59.2% of  the administrative elite, 38.3% of  the organizational 
elite, 50.8% of  the business elite, 65% of  the media elite, 63% of  the academic elite and 52% of  the 
cultural elite. 
5 The means show % of  respondents claiming to socialize very much, much or rather a lot with 
group. Inward refers to % socializing with people in same sphere (e.g. % of  political elite socializing 
with people in politics) while outward refers to mean % claiming to socialize much with people in 
the other spheres. 
6 ‘Often’ refers to the % of  respondents saying ‘rather often’, ‘often’ and ‘very often’.
References
Best, H., and Higley J. (2010). Democratic Elitism. New Theoretical and Comparative Perspectives. Leiden: Brill.
Christiansen, P., Møller, B., and Togeby L. (2001). Den Danske Elite. København: Hans Reitzels Forlag.
Coleman, J. (1988). “Social Capital in the Creation of  Human Capital”, The American Journal of  Sociology 
94, 95-120.
Cornell, A., and Lapuente, V. (2014). “Meritocratic Administration and Democratic Stability”, Journal of  
Democratization 21(7), 1286-1304.
Corbett, J. (2013). “Everybody Knows Everybody: Practicing Politics in the Pacific Islands”, Democrati-
zation 22(1), 51-72.
Dahl, R. (1961). Who governs? New Haven: Yale University Press.
Dahlström, C., Peters, B.G., and Pierre, J. Steering from the Centre. Toronto: University of  Toronto Press.
Dowding, K. (1996). Power. Minneapolis: University of  Minnesota Press.
Dunleavy, P., and O’Leary, B. 1987. Theories of  the State. London: Macmillan.
Erlingsson, G., Linde, J., and Öhrvall, R. (2016). “Distrust in Utopia? Public Perceptions of  Corruption 
and Political Support in Iceland Before and After the financial Crisis of  2008”, Government and Op-
position 51(4), 553-579.
Granovetter, M. (1973). “The Strength of  Weak ties”, American Journal of  Sociology 78(6), 1360-1380.
Grímsson, Ó.R. (1976). “The Icelandic Power Structure 1800–2000”, Scandinavian Political Studies 11, 
9–33.
Guðmundsson, H. (1979). Uppruni Sjálfstæðisflokksins. Reykjavík: Félagsvísindadeild and Örn & Örlygur.
Held, D. (1996). Models of  Democracy (2nd ed.). Cambridge: Polity.
Higley, J., and Pakulski, J. (2012). “Elites, Elitism and Elite Theory: Unending Confusion?”. Retrived 
from http://paperroom.ipsa.org/papers/paper_11235.pdf
Hoffmann-Lange, U. (2006). Methodological Developments in Elite Research. Paper for presentation at 
the 20th IPSA World Congress „Is Democracy Working?“. Fukuoka, Japan July 9-14, 2006. 
Indriðason, I.H. (2005). “A Theory of  Coalitions and Clientelism: Coalition Politics in Iceland. 1945-







Jónsson, G. (2014). “Iceland and the Nordic Model of  Consensus Democracy”, Scandinavian Journal of  
History 39(4), 510-528.
Kopecky, P., and Mair, P. (2012). “Conclusion: Party Patronage in Contemporary Europe”, in P. Kop-
ecky. P. Mair and M. Spirova (eds.), Party Patronage and Party Government in European Democracies (pp. 
196-205). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Kristinsson, G.H. (1993). “Valdakerfið fram til Viðreisnar”, in G. Hálfdánarson and S. Kristjánsson 
(eds.), Íslensk þjóðfélagsþróun 1880-1990: Ritgerðir (pp. 321-354). Reykjavík: Félagsvísindastofnun and 
Sagnfræðistofnun.
Kristinsson, G.H. (1994). Embættismenn og stjórnmálamenn. Skipulag og vinnubrögð í íslenskri stjórnsýslu. 
Reykjavík: Heimskringla.
Kristinsson, G.H. (1996). “Parties. States and Patronage”, West European Politics 19(3), 433-457.
Kristinsson, G.H. (2012). “Party Patronage in Iceland: Rewards and Control Appointments”, in P. Ko-
pecky, P. Mair and M. Spirova (eds.), Party Patronage and Party Government in European Democracies (pp. 
186-205). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Kristinsson, G.H. (2014). Hin mörgu andlit lýðræðis. Reykjavík: University of  Iceland Press.
Kristinsson, G.H., and Indriðason, I.H. (2007). “Stjórnsækni og stefnufesta”, Stjórnmál og stjórnsýsla 4(1), 
89-111.
Kristjánsson, S. (1993). “Stjórnmálaflokkar. ríkisvald og samfélag 1959-1990”, in G. Hálfdánarson 
and Svanur Kristjánsson (eds.). Íslensk þjóðfélagsþróun 1880-1990: Ritgerðir (pp. 355-398). Reykjavík: 
Félagsvísindastofnun and Sagnfræðistofnun.
Kristjánsson, S. (1994). Frá flokksræði til persónustjórnmála. Fjórflokkarnir 1959-1991. Reykjavík: Félags-
vísindastofnun Háskóla Íslands.
Lindblom, C. (1977). Politics and Markets. New York: Basic Books.
Lukes, S. (1974). Power. A Radical View. London: Macmillan.
Michels, R. (1962). Political Parties: a Sociological Study of  the Oligarchical Tendencies of  Modern Democracy. New 
York: The Free Press.
Mosca, G. (1939). The Ruling Class. New York: McGraw-Hill.
Nordal, J. (1994). Málsefni. Reykjavík: Hið íslenzka bókmenntafélag.
Pareto, V. (1961). “The Circulation of  Elites”, in T. Parsons (ed.), Theories of  Society; Foundations of  Modern 
Sociological Theory (pp. 551-8). New York: The Free Press.
Peters, B., and Pierre, J. (2004). Politicization of  the Civil Service in Comparative Perspective. London: Routledge.
Petersson, O., Hirdman, Y., Persson, I., and Olsen, J. (1990). Demokrati och Makt i Sverige. Stockholm: 
SOU.
Putnam, R. (1977). “Elite Transformation in Advanced Industrial Societies. An Empirical Assessment 
of  the Theory of  Technocracy”, Comparative Political Studies 10(3), 383-412.
Ruostetsaari, I. (2007). “Nordic Elites in Comparative Perspective”, Comparative Sociology 6, 158-189.
Russel, B. (1938). Power: A New Social Analysis. London: Allen & Unwin.
Schumpeter, J. (1976). Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy. London: George Allen & Unwin. 
Shefter, M. (1974). Political Parties and the State. The American Historical Experience. Princeton: Princeton 
University Press.
Torfason, M., Einarsdóttir, Þ., Rafnsdóttir, G., and Sigurðardóttir, M. (2017). “Elítur á Íslandi – ein-
sleitni og innbyrðis tengsl”, Stjórnmál og stjórnsýsla 13(1), 1-26.
Vibert, F. (2007). The Rise of  the Unelected. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Vilhelmsdóttir, S., and Kristinsson, G.H. (2015). Legitimacy and Democracy in Iceland: Before and 
After the Crash. Conference on “Workings of  Democracy. Practices. Norms and Understanding”. 
University of  Iceland. Reykjavík May 27-29, 2015.
Weber, M. (1968). Economy and Society. Berkley: University of  California Press.
World Economic Forum (2016). The Global Gender Gap Report 2016. Retrieved from http://www3.wefo-
rum.org/docs/GGGR16/WEF_Global_Gender_Gap_Report_2016.pdf  
Wrong, D. (1995). Power: Its forms. bases and uses. London: Transaction Publishers.
Østerud, Ø., Engelstad, F., and Selle, P. (2004). Makten og Demokratiet. Oslo: Gyldendahl Akademisk.




Table A1. Ascriptive social status of MPs: Paternal education (%)
1917 1949 1965 1988 2004 2016
Low 62 65 52 44 18 17
Intermediary 13 21 35 44 57 46















Note: Low means elementary school or less. High means university education. All others are intermediary.
Table A2. Ascriptive social status of elites 2015: Paternal education (%)
Low Intermediary High Total
Politicians 18.0 46.0 36.0 100.0
Administrators 19.5 46.3 34.1 100.0
Organizations 35.7 37.5 26.8 100.0
Business 24.1 53.5 22.4 100.0
Media 17.5 37.5 45.0 100.0
Academia 23.4 29.8 46.8 100.0











Table A3. Gender of MPs, 1917–2016 (%)
 Research year  
Gender 1917 1949 1965 1988 2004 2016 Total
Male 100.0 98.1 98.3 79.4 68.3 52.4 80.9























tional Business Media Academic Cultural Total
Male 57.4 62.3 64.1 77.4 64.3 70.6 58.0 64.7

























Table A5. Proportion of MPs with parents with parliamentary experience (%)
Research year  
Parents with parliamentary experience 1917 1949 1965 1988 2004 2016 Total
No 90.0 92.3 95.0 90.5 92.1 93.7 92.4

















Table A6. Education of MPs, 1917–2016 (%)
Research year
Education of MPs 1917 1949 1965 1988 2004 2016 Total
Elementary school or less 19.4 10.6 10.3 4.8 6.6 4.8 8.6
Intermediary 33.3 38.3 41.4 46.8 32.3 16.1 33.6
University 33.3 31.9 34.5 27.4 41.0 41.3 35.2

















Table A7. Self-reported education of elites according to the 2015 survey (%)






zational Business Media Academic Cultural Total
Elementary school 3.9 0.0 6.9 3.4 5.0 0.0 0.0 2.4
Intermediary 9.8 0.8 20.7 6.8 10.4 0.0 8.9 7.1



















Table A8. Proportion of MPs with a background in party work and local 
government prior to entering parliament (%)
 1917 1949 1965 1988 2004 2016
No background known 42.5 46.2 28.3 15.9 17.5 28.6
Background in local government 55.0 51.9 51.7 46.0 44.4 44.4
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Table A9. Elite connections to political parties (% of all elites who are/have been 
attached to parties)







Political elite 7.7 5.8 11.5 75.0 100.0 52
Administrative elite 55.1 27.6 5.5 11.8 100.0 127
Organizational elite 43.3 23.3 13.3 20.0 100.0 60
Business elite 48.3 26.7 6.7 18.3 100.0 60
Media elite 63.4 17.0 12.2 7.3 100.0 41
Academic elite 60.4 22.9 8.3 8.3 100.0 48
Cultural elite 52.2 37.0 8.7 2.2 100.0 46
All elites 47.9 23.7 8.8 19.6 100.0 434






cratic Alliance Left Greens Others
Political elite 31.9 27.7 23.4 12.8 14.9
Administrative elite 56.9 10.3 34.5 1.7 1.7
Organizational elite 59.5 10.8 35.1 10.8 5.4
Business elite 76.7 16.7 10.0 0.0 0.0
Media elite 40.0 13.3 46.7 13.3 6.7
Academic elite 38.9 5.6 44.4 16.7 11.1
Cultural elite 22.7 0 77.3 50.0 18.2
All elites 48.9 13.7 34.8 11.9 7.5
Note: SDA includes the Social Democratic Party, People’s Alliance, Þjóðvaki and Bandalag jafnaðarmanna. Figures add up 
to more than 100% because some have been members of  more than one party.
Table A11. Mean number of careers among elite respondents
Elite groups M SD N
Political 2.83 1.410 52
Administrative 2.00 1.064 130
Organizational 1.77 1.123 64
Business 1.58 1.095 62
Media 1.79 1.138 42
Academic 1.72 1.161 50
Cultural 2.06 1.126 49







Table A12. With whom the elites socialize (% who socialize very much, much or 














Politicians 86.0 26.0 31.6 18.9 30.6 10.7 2.3
Public administrators 66.0 79.7 40.4 18.9 30.6 31.7 22.8
Organizational people 48.0 34.2 72.0 18.9 25.0 12.8 29.5
Business people 52.0 46.3 79.0 87.2 61.1 25.6 27.2
Media people 38.0 18.8 22.8 13.7 91.4 14.9 31.8
Academics 48.0 46.3 33.4 25.8 27.8 91.5 52.3
Culture and arts 36.0 22.8 12.3 12.1 61.1 29.9 95.4
Table A13. How useful do you feel the following social connections have been to 
your career? All elites (%)













Very seldom 42.0 22.7 28.6 7.6 50.6 40.0
Seldom 19.3 15.6 14.3 4.4 12.1 16.1
Rather seldom 9.3 14.9 8.2 5.9 6.5 11.7
Neither nor 14.3 16.8 17.6 12.2 14.4 12.7
Rather often 6.0 15.1 16.8 23.8 10.5 11.7
Often 4.8 9.0 12.2 25.9 4.0 4.4
Very often 4.5 5.9 2.6 20.5 7.9 3.4
 Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
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Table A14. Women in elite groups (%)
Age Male Female Total N
Political elite 20–49 53.3 46,7 100.0 30
50–59 41.7 52.9 100.0 17
60 or older 100.0 0 100.0 7
Administrative elite 20–49 36.7 63.3 100.0 30
50–59 55.1 44.9 100.0 49
60 or older 84.3 15.7 100.0 51
Organizational elite 20–49 44.4 55.6 100.0 18
50–59 66.7 33.3 100.0 30
60 or older 81.3 18.8 100.0 16
Business elite 20–49 54.2 45.8 100.0 24
50–59 86.4 13.6 100.0 22
60 or older 100.0 0 100.0 16
Media elite 20–49 50.0 50.0 100.0 22
50–59 90.0 10.0 100.0 10
60 or older 70.0 30.0 100.0 10
Academic elite 20–49 54.5 45.5 100.0 11
50–59 83.3 16.7 100.0 18
60 or older 68.2 31.8 100.0 22
Cultural elite 20–49 41.7 58.3 100.0 24
50–59 75.0 25.0 100.0 16
60 or older 70.0 30.0 100.0 10
Table A15. Percentage of elites who have been party members
Pol Adm Org Bus Media Acad Cult
No party 7.8 59.2 38.3 50.8 65.0 63.0 52.1
SDA 19.5 10.9 17.8 4.8 13.6 14.8 17.9
LG 10.6 0.7 5.5 0.0 3.9 5.6 10.6
PP 23.1 3.6 6.9 8.0 3.9 1.8 2.4
IP 26.6 20.4 31.5 36.5 11.7 13.0 5.7
Others 12.4 5.1 0.0 0.0 1.9 1.8 11.4
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Note: The % of  non-party members is based on a question on party membership, while the division among parties is based 







Table A16. Education of Icelandic elites in 2015 according to subject area (% of 














Arts 4.4 0.8 7.0 3.8 8.3 4.2 71.4 11.1
Humanities 22.2 13.1 11.6 0.0 44.4 16.7 47.6 19.3
Technical 6.7 12.3 9.3 17.0 2.8 0.0 0.0 10.0
Agricultural 4.4 4.9 2.3 1.9 0.0 2.1 0.0 2.8
Educational 17.8 7.4 14.0 5.7 2.8 18.8 4.8 9.8
Natural sciences 2.2 12.3 4.7 5.7 5.6 35.4 0.0 10.3
Health 6.7 10.7 7.0 0.0 0.0 25.0 0.0 8.0
Economics and 
business 28.9 20.5 55.8 71.7 22.2 12.5 7.1 30.1
Social 24.4 18.9 11.6 3.8 55.6 14.6 9.5 18.5
Law 20.0 40.2 11.6 15.1 0.0 4.2 0.0 18.8
Personal services  - -  - 1.9 -  - - 0.3
Security 2.2 5.0 0.0 1.9 2.9 0.0 0.0 2.3
Note: Figures add up to more than 100% because many respondents have studied more than one subject.
